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CASES NOTED

ADMIRALTY-INDEMNITY PROVISIONS
IN MARITIME CONTRACTS
An employee of a stevedoring company was injured in the performance
of a stevedoring contract between the stevedoring company and a shipowner. The employee brought a libel against the shipowner, who impleaded
the stevedoring company pursuant to an indemnity provision in the contract. The federal district court, having dismissed the libel on the merits,
found the claim for indemnification to be moot. The court of appeals
reversed and remanded the case for an adjudication of the shipowner's
petition for indemnification, as well as a determination of the employee's
damages. The district court, after determining the amount of damages,
construed the indemnity provision to be governed by the law of the State
of New York and denied recovery. Held, reversed: the shipowner was
entitled to full indemnification; an indemnity provision in a stevedoring
contract is governed by federal admiralty principles. A/S J. Ludwig

Mowinckels Rederi v. Commercial Stevedoring Co., 256 F.2d 227 (2d
Cir. 1958).*
The federal judiciary in past decisions has consistently refused to sever
an indemnity provision' from the text of a contract, cognizable in admiralty,2
and deny it federal admiralty jurisdiction.8 A stevedoring contract has been
held to be a maritime contract. 4 These principles were demonstrated by
the decisions of the various courts involved in the Porello case," which
dealt with an ambiguous indemnity provision in a stevedoring contract.
The court of appeals in Porello v. United States' assumed federal admiralty

* Since the writing of this casenote the parties settled the case and the petition
for certiorari which had previously been filed was discontinued. 1959 Am. Mar. Cas. 545.
1. "INDEMNITY. A collateral contract or assurance, by which one person engages
to secure another against an anticipated loss or to prevent him from being damnified
by the legal consequences of an act or forbearance on the part of one of the parties or
of some third person ..... BLACx, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
2. For contracts not cognizable in admiralty in the first instance see Admiral
Oriental Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1936)' The Wonder, 79 F.2d
312 (2d Cir. 1935); Pacific Coast S.S. Co. v. Moore, 70 Fed. 870 (N.D.Cal. 1896),
aof'd, 76 Fed. 993 (9th Cir. 1896); see also Moran Towing & 'ransp. Co. v. United
States, 56 F.Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
3. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947); Moran Towing &
Transp. Co. v. Navigazone Libera Triestina, S.A., 92 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1937); Finley v
United States, 130 F.Supp. 788 (D.N.J. 1955); Severn v. United States, 69 F.Supp. 21
(S.D.N.Y. 1946); Cheen v. War Shipping Administration, 66 F.Supp. 393 (E.D.N.Y,
1946).
4. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 456 (1947); Atlantic
Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 62 (1913); Jarka Corp. v. Hellenic Lines,
182 F.2d 916, 919 (2d Cir. 1950); The Muskegon, 275 Fed. 348 (2d Cir. 1921).
5. The Porello case appeared on all three levels of the federal judiciary. American
Stevedores Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947); American Stevedores Inc. v. Porello,
328 U.S. 827 (1946); Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946); Porello v.
United States, 94 F.Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Porello v. United States, 53 F.Supp.
569 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
6. 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946).
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jurisdiction7 and undertook to fashion the rule that despite the ambiguity
in the provision, full indemnification was required.8 When the Porelo case
reached the United States Supreme Court, Justice Reed, speaking for
the majority, rejected the stevedoring company's contention that the court
of appeals as an admiralty court did not have jurisdiction of the indemnity
provision of the stevedoring contract stating:
A stevedoring contract is maritime. . . . And although admiralty
jurisdiction over contracts partly maritime and partly non-maritime
in nature is doubtful the cases raising such doubts are concerned
only with contracts for the performance of partly non-maritime
activities. . . . To sever a contract provision for indemnity for
damages arising out of the performance of wholly maritime activitics would only needlessly multiply litigation. ....
.0

There is reason to believe that the United States Supreme Court
in future cases may sever an indemnity provision from a maritime contract
and exclude it from federal admiralty principles. A current trend of the
Supreme Court in admiralty cases toward resolving doubts in favor of
applying state law lends support to this belief. The outstanding case
representing this trend is Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.' 2
Decided eight years after Porello, the Wilburn case held that a maritime
insurance policy must be construed under the law of the state where made.
The prompting factor for this decision was undoubtedly the historical role
the states had played in the regulation of all phases of the insurance
industry and insurance contracts, a' but the states have also regulated the

7. The court of appeals was not overly concerned about the admiralty jurisdictional
issue, since the iurisdiction could rest on the fact that the indemnitee was the United
States. ld. at 609.
8. Compare United States v. Wallace, 18 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1927); Shamrock
Towing Co. v. City of New York, 16 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1926). For an example of a
case where the indemnity provision was not ambiguous see United States v. Arrow
Stevedoring Co., 175 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1949).
9. American Stevedores Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947). The Supreme
Court partially reversed the court of appeals on grounds not necessarily destructive
of the interpretation given by the court of appeals to the indemnity provision. For
the final disposition of the case see Porello v. United States, 94 F.Supp. 952 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950), which in effect followed the court of appeals' construction in Porello V.
United States, 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946).
10. American Stevedores Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 456 (1947)' Cf Justice
Reed's dissent in Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 34A U.S. 310,
324-35 (1955). In Finley v. United States, 130 F.Supp. 788 (D.N.J. 1955), the
federal district court held that a contract to convert a vessel was maritime, that an
indemnity provision ought not be severed from the contract, and that the indemnity
provision was maritime. See also Mangone v. Moore.McCornack Lines, 152 F.Supp.
848 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
11. This trend is noted in Comment, 50 Nw. U. L. R.,v. 677, 683-84 (1955).
12. 348 U.S. 310 (1955); see also Saskatchewan Govt. Ins. Office v. Ciaramitro,
234 F.2d 491 (lst Cir. 1956).
13. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 316-20 (1955);
see VANCE, INSURANCE 36-51 (3d ed. 1951).
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business and activities of stevedores and longshoremen.' 4 Further indication
of the current trend may be found in Madruga v. Superior Court, 5 which
upheld a state court's jurisdiction to order the partition of ships in a
proceeding in personam, and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing,'6 where

the Supreme Court seemed to decide that the Federal Limited Liability
Act did not foreclose an action brought directly against marine insurers
under a Louisiana statute.
Similar to Porello, the court of appeals in the instant case was confronted with a stevedoring contract containing an indemnity provision
susceptible to more than one interpretation. 17 If federal admiralty principles applied, the shipowner would be entitled to full indemnification, 18
but if the law of the State of New York (where the contract was negotiated
and performed) applied, the shipowner would be entitled to no indemnification.19 The court was troubled as to whether the Wilburn case
required a reconsideration of Porello.20 In solving the problem the court
of appeals reasoned that the Supreme Court in Wilburn "was balancing
two divergent considerations - the continuance of traditional state power
to regulate all kinds of insurance ... , as against the desirability of uniform
admiralty rules [and] did not intend to rule on the propriety of state
regulation of other types of maritime contracts." 2' 1 Limiting the Wilburn
case to the area of maritime insurance, the court reaffirmed its decision
in Porello v. United States.

14. E.g., N.Y. UNCONSOLIDATED LAws §6700aa-zz. §6 700aa 4 reads: "The States
of New York and New Jersey hereby find and declare that the occupations of longshoremen, stevedores . . . are affected with a public interest requiring their regulation
and that such regulation shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the two
states."

15. 346 U.S. 556 (1954).
16. 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
17. The shipowner had been held liable for personal injuries suffered by an
employee of the stevedoring company. Amador v. A/S 1. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi,
224 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. den., A/S 7. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Amador,
350 U.S. 901 (1955). The stevedoring company argued that since the indemnitor and
the indemnitee were joint-tortfeasors, full indemnification should not be required.
The indemnity provision was not clear whether the absence of negligence on the part
of the indemnitee was a prerequisite to recovery. A/S I. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v.
Commercial Stevedoring Co., 256 F.2d 227, 228-29 (2d Cir, 1958).
18. Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946).
19. Mostyn v. Delaware L.&W. R.R., 160 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1947), especially n. 9.
20. The court of appeals initially raised the issue in Amador v. A/S 1. Ludwig
Mowinckels Rederi, 224 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1955). This was a previous appeal of
the instant case.
21. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Commercial Stevedoring Co., 256 F.2d
227, 231 (2d Cir. 1958). The district court in the instant case felt that there was less
reason for uniformity in the law governing the indemnity provisions in stevedoring
contracts than there was in the law governing contracts for marine insurance. Amador v.
The Ronda, 146 F.Supp. 617, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The court of appeals believed
otherwise. A/S I. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Commercial Stevedoring Co., supra at
231 n. 1.
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The Supreme Court opinion in the Wilburn case engendered much
unfavorable comment.22 The court of appeals in the A/S J. Ludwig
Mowinckels Rederi case appeared determined that the Wilburn rule
should not be recklessly expanded. The fact situation before the court
was ideal to defeat any possible cxtcntion of the Wilburn nle. An
indemnity provision in any contract approaches the field of insurance as
close as possible without actually entering the realm of that subject. 3
Should the decision of the court of appeals be either affirmed by the
Supreme Court2 4 or followed by the other circuits, the day of Wilburn
with its tendency toward the application of state law in the field of maritime
25
contracts may well be in its twilight.
MICHAEL C. SLOTNICK

DIVORCE-DECREE MUST SPECIFY PREVAILING PARTY
In a divorce action the complainant wife alleged extreme cruelty and
requested custody of the child. Her husband counterclaimed for divorce
on the ground of extreme cruelty and also sought custody of the child.
The court entered a decree granting a divorce without specifically adjudicating the equities for and against the parties and granted temporary
custody of the child to the husband. Held, the chancellor must reconsider
and specifically determine by his final decree the party entitled to the
divorce. Friedman v. Friedman, 100 So.2d 167 (Fla. 1958).
English ecclesiastical courts allowed a defendant to counterclaim for
affirmative relief in a divorce suit by setting out the misconduct of the

22. For a severely critical analysis of the Wilburn case see GILMORE & BLACK,
61-63 (1957); see also Comment, 50 Nw. U. L. Rv. 677, 681-83 (1955);
Note, 1 N. Y. L. F. 360 (1955). For a more favorable comment see Note, 103 U. PA.
L. REV. 813 (1955); see also Note, 35 B. U. L. REV. 435 (1955).
23. An insurance contract contains five elements: one party possesses an insurable
interest; the interest is subject to some well-defined peril, which may cause loss to the
riskbearer; the other party to the contract assumes the risk of loss ;the contract is an
integral part of a general scheme for distributing the loss; and the insured makes a
ratable contribution. Where only the first three elements are present, a risk shifting
device results. An indemnity provision in a contract belongs to the category of riskshifting devices. VANCE, INSURANCE 1-5 (3d ed. 1951).
24. A/S 7. Ludwig Mowinckes Rederi v. Commercial Stevedoring Co. has been
filed on the appellate docket of the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari. 27
U. S. L. WEEK 3057 (Sept. 9, 1958),
25. Gilmore and Black in their recent hornbook on admiralty inquire as to the
meaning of the Wilburn case: "Wilburu may mean merely that the States are to have
a limited competency to regulate certain terms of marine policies. It could as a matter
of cold logic be read to mean that there is no federal maritime law at all. It may very
well turn out to mean anything between these extremes." GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY
63 (1957). The A/S 1. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi case, limiting the Wilburn case to
maritime insurance, appears to answer this inquiry.
1. The court also reversed a companion case, on the same grounds, Hlowell v.
Howell, 100 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1958).
AnmIRALTY

